PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ARBITRATION.

The Supreme Court of Illinois decides in White Star Min.
Co. v. Hultberg, 77 N. E. 327, that an award made without
fraud or mistake apparent upon its face, in conAward:
Conclusiveness formity with a general submission, will not be

interfered with or set aside for errors of law or fact committed by the arbitrators. Two judges dissent, and the
opinions rendered in the case are elaborate and exhaustive.
ATTORNEY.

The Supreme Court of Illinois decides in People &c.
v. Proper, 77 N. E. 2o8, that concealment and failure by
Disbarment

an applicant for admission to the bar to disclose
crimes and disreputable acts such as would have

prevented his admission, committed recently before his application, are as much a fraud on the court, warranting disbarment, as crimes committed after his admission. Compare
People v. Gilmore, 214 11. 569, 69 L. R. A. 701.
BANKRUPTCY.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, decides in Bank of Ravenswood v. Johnson., 143 Fed.
463, that a referee has no power to punish a
Contempt
witness for contempt in refusing to answer questions or to produce documents, that power being expressly
vested in the District Court. Compare Smith v. Belfold,
io6 Fed. 658.
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BANKRUPTCY (Continued).

The United States Supreme Court holds in Thomas G.
Bush &c. v. . M. Elliott, Jr., 26 S. C. R. 668, that diversity
of citizenship between the trustees in bankruptcy
Suit by
Trustee
and the defendant is not necessary to the exercise by a federal circuit court of its jurisdiction of a suit
brought by such trustees upon an alleged cause of action
for moneys due the bankrupt at and prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy, where the citizenship of the bankrupt
and the defendant is such that the former might have sued
in the Federal Court but for the bankruptcy proceedings.
Compare Bardes v. FirstNat. Bank, 178 U. S. 524.
The United States District Court, W. D. Texas, decides
In re A. F. Hardie & Co., 143 Fed. 607 that a materially
false statement in writing made by a partner
Right to
Discharge
in the ordinary course of business.of the partnership in buying merchandise, for the purpose of obtaining
goods on credit and upon which they were obtained by the
firm, affects all the partners and debars another partner from
the right to a discharge in bankruptcy. Compare Strang v.
Bradner, 114 U. S. 561.
BANKS AND BANKING.

The Supreme Court of the United States holds in Noble
v. Doughten, 83 Pac. io48, that if the payee of a check
drawn on a bank in a city other than that of his
Depo~sit: o
Check:
residence indorse and deposit it in his home bank
in the usual and ordinary manner, and without
Ownership
any agreement or understanding in reference to the transaction other than such as the law implies, the check becomes
the property of the indorsee. The fact that the indorsee
may have the right to charge the check to the depositor's
account, if it should be dishonored after due diligence has
been exercised to collect it, does not effect the character
of the transfer or render the bank any the less the owner
of the check. Compare Burton v. United States, 25 S. C.
R. 243
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OF THE LAW.

BILLS AND NOTES.

In re A. F. Hardie & Co., 143 Fed. 553, the United
States District Court, W. D. Texas, decides that promissory
notes signed by a corporation first and by a
AsotnrshMk. partnership second as a joint maker, impart
notice on their face that the transaction was not
one in the usual and ordinary course of borrowing money
for partnership purposes, and to bind the firm it is incumbent
on a purchaser, although for value and before maturity, to
prove either that the proceeds were used by the firm, or that
all of the partners either assented to the execution of the
notes or subsequently ratified the same.

CARRIERS.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi holds in Southern
Express Co. v. Marks, Rothenberg & Co., 40 S. 65, that a
Limitation of stipulation in the contract of an express comLiability
pany -for carriage of a package that the negligence of the railroad company over whose road the package
shall be carried shall not be imputed to the express company
is in violation of public policy. Compare Telegraph Co.
v. Wells, 82 Miss. 733.

In Westcott v. Seattle,, R. & S. Ry. Co., 84 Pac. 588,
the Supreme Court of Washington lays down the general
rule that a carrier was liable for injuries inflicted
Dog In Car
upon a passenger by a dog brought into a street
car by another passenger and permitted to remain there.
"A street car company," it says, "has no right to carry
dogs upon a coach that is set apart for passengers, and if it
does so and damage is caused by said dog, it must respond
to the same." The rule is interesting in view of the fact
that the court does not consider whether any carelessness
on the part of the carrier was shown, but makes the liability
depend on the mere fact of having permitted the dog on the
vehicle.
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CARRIERS (Continued).

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia decides
in Dudley v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 52 S. E. 718,
that an inspection of property shipped by a cornWrongful
mon carrier in sealed cars, unauthorizedly perDelivery:
mitted by such carrier at the point of destinaConversilon

-

tion, in consequence of which the consigner, who was also
the consignee, was prevented from consummating a contemplated sale thereof, does not amount to a wrongful delivery
by the common carrier, so as to make it liable for the value
of the property as for a conversion thereof.
The Supreme Court of Georgia decides in Merchants' &
Miners' Transps. Co. v. Moore & Co., 52 S. E. 802, that
Limitation of when a carrier is guilty of conversion resulting
Liability
from a wrong delivery, he cannot take advantage
of a stipulation in a bill of lading which provides that
"claims for loss or damage must be made in writing to the
agent at the point of delivery promptly after the arrival of
,the property, and if delayed more than thirty days after
delivery of the property, or after due time for the delivery
thereof, no carrier hereunder shall be liable in any event."
Compare Savannah Ry. Co. v. Sloat, 93 Ga. 803.
In Holmes v. North German Lloyd S. S. Co., 77 N E.
21, it appeared that a steamship company issued a passage
ticket limiting its liability for loss of personal
Loss of
Package
effects of passengers to $ioo, unless the value of
the same, in excess of that sum, be declared before the issue
of the contract or delivery of the effects to the ship and payment of freight at current rates thereon. Hand baggage
was delivered to the Company's baggemaster at his direction,
and on his statment that it would be sent to the passenger's
room, but it was never delivered. Under these facts the
Court of Appeals of New York holds, against the dissent
of three judges, that the loss, if unexplained, established a
prima facie case of negligence for which the company was
liable, notwithstanding the failure of the passenger at the
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CARRIERS (Continued).

time of delivery to declare the value thereof or pay excess
freight thereon; such requirement not applying to hand
baggage. Compare Steers v. Liverpool &c. Co., 57 N. Y. I.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey decides
in Lembeck v. Jarvis Terminal &c. Co., 63 Atl. 257, that
where freight charges were due from a conLien
signor to a carrier and the carrier delivered the
goods to a consignee on its promise to retain them until
the freight charges were paid, if the consignee be regarded as
the agent of the carrier the lien for the charges was terminated on their payment to the consignee, though by reason
of its insolvency the amount was never received by the
carrier.
In Brigham v. Southern Pac. Co., 84 Pac. 306, The
Court of Appeals, Second District, California, decides that
dentification where the purchaser of a railroad ticket agreed
of Passenger

to identify himself as the original purchaser

required by the carrier's conductor or agent, he was only
required to produce such reasonable evidence of his identity
within his reach as ought to satisfy a reasonable man,
honestly seeking to do justice between the carrier and the
passenger, and hence instructions that he was bound to
identify himself " to the the satisfaction of the train agent"
were properly refused.

CONTRACTS.

In P. 1. Bowlin Liquor Co. v. Brandenburg, io6 N. W.
497, the Supreme Court of Iowa decides that where an order
Sunday

for the purchase of Liquor was taken on Sun-

day, but the delivery and acceptance thereof by
the buyer occurred on a subsequent secular day, the fact
that the order was taken on Sunday was no defence to an
action for the price. Compare McKinnis v. Estae, 81 Ia.
749
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CONTRACTS (Continued).

The Court of Appeals of Maryland decides in Maryland
Trust Co. v. National Mechanics' Bank, 63 Atl. 70. that
where a corporation which had no right to purIllegaity:
in
Parr
chase its own stock arranged with a bank to
Delicto
furnish money for the purchase
of a large
amount of stock by brokers for the benefit of the corporation.
and in order to deceive the public as to the value and desirability of the stock, the contract was illegal and contrary to
public policy, and the bank, having knowledge of the illegal
purpose, was not entitled to recover the money. Compare
Scott v. Brown, 2 Q. B. (1892) 724.

CRIMINAL LAW.

In People v. Bunkers, 84 Pac. 364, the Court of Appeals,
Third District, California, decides that the evidence essential to corroborate the testimony of an accomAccomplice:
Corroboration plice must create more than a mere suspicion,
but need not be absolutely convincing, nor need it extend
to every fact covered by the statements of the accomplice,
and is sufficient, if standing alone it tends to connect defendant with the crime charged. Compare People v. Barker,
114 Cal. 62o.

DEEDS.

The Supifeme Court of Idaho decides in Whitmer v.
Schenk, 83 Pac. 775, that upon fulfilment of the conditions of an escrow agreement and the delivery
Delivery
Escrow.
of the deed to the grantee, the deed will relate
back to the date of making the escrow agreement for the
purpose of cutting off any intervening rights or equities
acquired by a third party, who had notice of the terms and
conditions of the escrow. See in connection herewith Macdonald v. Huff, 77 Cal. 279.
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DIVORCE.

The Court of Chancery of New Jersey decides in McAllistcr v. McAllister, 62 Atl. I131, that where parties intermarry
clandestinely, without any intention of estabDesertion:
Evidence
lishing a matrimonial domicile and on an agreement to live separately for the present, the separate living of
the husband will not be a desertion of the wife until she
repudiates the agreement for separate living by offering to
live with him and demanding that he should provide for theii
living together. A demand by the wife that the husband
should support her will not be sufficient, unless accompanied by a bona fide offer to live with him. Compare
Currierv. Currier,59 Atl. 4.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

With two judges dissenting, the Supreme Court of Kansas
decides in Dethample v. Lake Koen Navigation &c. Co.,
84 Pac. 544, that in a condemnation proceeding
Damges
for a perpetual easement of an entire tract of
land, which has only a surface value, the basis of the owner's
right of recovery is the value of the land, the same as if the
fee had also been appropriated. See also K. C. W. &c.
Railroad Co. v. Fisher, 49 Kan. 7.

EVIDENCE.

The difficult question of how far the exclamations of bystanders can be regarded as part of the res gestae of a transaction renders welcome any new decision upon
Res Gestic
the matter. In Johnson v. St. Paul & W. Coal
Co., io5 N. W. 1048, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
dealing with this question holds that an exclamation by one
present at the time of an accident, made almost immediately
after the accident and at the scene of the accident, to the
effect that "the book hit him," was res gestae of the accident.
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EVIDENCE (Continued).

The Supreme Court of Kansas holds in Federal Betternient Co. v. Reeves, 84 Pac. 560, that a physician, while testifying as an expert, is not permitted to testify to
his conclusions of the permanency of an injury
to his patient, based partially upon the history of the injury
detailed to him by the patient or other person, and partially
upon his own examination. From this principle one judge
dissents. Compare Stewart v. Everts, 76 Wis. 35.
Opinions:
Experts

HOMICIDE.

In Avent v. State, 40 Southern 483, the Supreme Court
of Mississippi decides that a verdict of guilty of murder,
with an addition that the jury "beg the mercy
Verdict:
Sentence
of the court," the, court remaining silent, is insufficient to sustain a sentence of death. See also Smith
v. State, 75 Mass. 558.

INJUNCTIONS.

In Everett Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical
Union &c., 53 S. E. 273, the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia, laying down -the general rule that
uItting
Eoymeat: though members of a typographical union may
lawfully combine, and, except as they
are bound
by contract, quit their employment on refusal to grant their
demands, and may by persuasion and argument induce others
to join them, they may be restrained by injunction from
molesting their former employer by bribery, intimidation,
and coercion of its employes, but, it is held, .the payment by
a typographical imion of weekly benefits and transportation
to employes leaving their employer and joining the union
is not bribery, which may be restrained by injunction.
Compare Gray v. Trades Council, 97 N. W. 663, 63
L. R. A. 753.
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INSURANCE.

Against the dissent of five judges. the Court of Errors
and Appeals of New Jersey decides in Hanrahanv. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 63 Atl. 280, that where a
Breach of
Warranty

statement in an application for life insurance,

warranted to be true, is false as far as it goes but fails to
answer the whole inquiry, there is a breach of warranty
which avoids the policy. The insurer waives an answer to
that part of the inquiry only which is left unanswered.
Compare Dinznick v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 69 N J. Law 384,
62 L. R. A. 774.
JUDGMENT.

Against the dissent of one judge, the Court of Appeals
of New York decides in Pakas v. Hollingshead, 77 N. E.
40, that where goods are sold to be delivered
Merger
and Bar
and paid for in installments, and the vendor refuses to deliver an installment, it is a breach of the entire
contract for which the vendee may immediately recover his
damages, or he may wait until the time for the delivery of
the goods has expired and then recover, but he cannot maintain successive actions to recover for breach on delivery of
each installment so that a judgment for damages for nondelivery of a part of the goods is a bar to an action for
failure to deliver the balance. Compare Nichols v. Scranton
Steel Co., 137 N. Y. 471.
JURY.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana decides in State v.
Stephens, 40 S. 523. that in a criminal prosecution, the
state has a right to demand jurors who are
Criminal
Chaes
Challenges

willing to convict the accused of crime with
which he is charged upon legal evidence,

whether direct or circumstantial, and its challenge, for cause,
of jurors who are unwilling to convict on circumstantial
evidence alone should be sustained, and does not authorize
the assumption that such evidence alone will be offered on
the trial, nor does it bind the state to offer only evidence of
that character.
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JURY (Continued).

In Brown v. State, io6 N. W. 536, it appeared that after
submission of a prosecution for rape to the jury, two of the
jurors who were against a conviction were made
Misconduc
ill by the fumes of tobacco emitted by their
fellow jurors in the jury-room. About 10.30 P. M. the
officer in charge of the jury informed them that the judge
was about to go to his hotel for the night, and the jury would
be locked up, unless they agreed very soon upon a verdict.
The jurymen, believing that they would be locked in the
jury-room, in order to escape therefrom announced their
willingness to agree to a verdict of conviction, which was
thereupon returned. Under these facts the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin decides that the verdict was the result of coercion
and could not be sustained. Compare Cornan v. State, 41
Wis. 312.

LIBEL.

In State v. O'Hagan, 63 Atl. 95, the, Supreme Court of
New Jersey, laying down the general rule that to publish of
a man that he has done that which is lawful
What
Constitutes
and proper, without ironical innuendo, does not
under ordinary circumstances, tend to injure his reputation, applies it to a case where the facts were as follows:
An indictment for libel set forth that defendant maliciously
published of and concerning a certain baker a writing containing the false statement that he refused to recognize the

bakers' union (innuendo, that he in his business refused to
recognize and employ members of the bakers' union, and
that all such members, together with all other persons,
should refuse to deal with him). This indictment is held
bad; the words attributed to defendant not being in themselves, defamatory, and the indictment containing no averment of facts to show that they bore a defamatory sense.
Compare Homer v. Engelhardt, 117 Mass. 539.
32
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LITERARY PROPERTY.

An interesting case with respect to literary property appears in State v. State Journal Co., lO4 N. W. 434, where
Unauthorized it is held that the unauthorized use of the literary
Use
production of another furnishes no grounds for
the recovery of damages, except through the federal copyright laws. All persons are at liberty to print, publish, and sell
the literary productions of others, unless they are protected
by a compliance with the Act of Congress for that purpose.
The case is with reference to the publication of the reports
of the Supreme Court of the State and it is said that if the
defendant printed and manufactured, to sell for its own
benefit, volumes of the reports of the Supreme Court of the
state, containing matter prepared by the state and not protected by copyright, and in so doing unlawfully used manuscripts and other property entrusted to the care of the defendant to enable it to perform its contracts to manufacture
specified volumes for the state, this would not give the state
title to books so unlawfully produced, so as to enable it by
injunction to prevent the defendant from disposing of the
books, or entitle the state to an accounting of the proceeds
of such sales. Compare Banks v. Manchester, 128 U. S. 244.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

In Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 62 At,
881, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds that the employment of persons by a company using a secret
Trade
Secrets
process for separating tin from scrap, with their
knowledge that the company was trying to keep the secret,
was sufficient to raise an implied agreement on their part not
to divulge it.
In Grim v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 84 Pac. 635, the
Supreme Court of Washington decides that where plaintiff
Pellow

and another for several years had been in de-

fendant's employ as motormen, operating two
freight motor-cars, which defendant maintained and operated for the purpose of hauling beer for a brewery, and
Servants
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MASTER AND SERVANT (Continued).

plaintiff and such other operated such cars without any fixed
schedule under arrangements made between themselves,
plaintiff and such other were fellow servants. Two judges
dissent.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

In Murray et al. v. Mayor etc., 63 Atl. 81, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey decides that where there is no requireI- rovements:ment in the charter of a city, or in any general

law, requiring improvement contracts to be let
to the lowest bidder, the municipal body has large discretion
in the premises, the exercise of which will not be reviewed
in the absence of proof of bad faith or fraud. Compare
Ryan v. Paterson,66 N. J. Law 533.
COntracts

In O'Donnell v. City of Syracuse, 76 N. E. 738, it appeared that a city for many years used a stream running
Injuries

from

through it for drainage in connection with its

sewer system under statutory authority, but
there was no absolute duty with respect to it enjoined on the
city by statute. Under these circumstances the Court of
Appeals of New York decides that it was not liable to a
property-owner where, because of an extraordinary freshet,
the waters of the creek rose to an unusual height, causing
much damage to his premises, on the ground that the city
had made no effort to protect the inhabitants of the city and
their property against such freshets, and contributed to it
by the use of the creek for its sewerage. Two judges, however, dissent. Compare Rochester W. L. Co. v. City of
Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463.
Freshets

The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey decides
in Doughten v. City of Camden, 63 At. 17o, that the impoAsgessmeuts
sition upon lands adjoining a public street, in
which is laid a pipe for the distribution of water
for the use of a city and of its inhabitants, of a fixed definite
sum per front foot, to be paid by the owner, for the expense
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taxation, nor under the power to tax property benefited by a

local public improvement because of, and not in- excess of,
benefits. Compare Van Wagoner v. Paterson, 67 N. J.
455.
SUBROGATION.

The Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds in Avon-bythe-Sea Land & Imp. Co. v. McDowell, 62 Atl. 865, that
where the owner or purchaser of property subPrior

Incumbrances ject to several incumbrances pays off a prior

incumbrance with his own money, the payment inures to the
benefit of the subsequent incumbrances, against which the
prior incumbrances cannot be kept alive for the owner's
benefit, even by express agreement, and on such payment by
the owner, without any agreement for subrogation or keeping the security alive, a court will not revive the prior incumbrances by application of the equitable doctrine of subrogation in favor of the owner. Compare Bolles v. Wade, 4 N. J.
Eq. 458.
SUPPORT.

In Griffin v. FairmountCoal Co., 53 S. E. 24, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia decides that the vendor
of land may sell and convey his coal and grant to
Conveyance
of IvTi.ng
the vendee the right to enter upon and under
Rigbt
said land and-to mine, excavate, and remove all
the coal purchased and paid for by him, and, if the removal
of the coal necessarily causes the surface to subside or break,
the grantor cannot be heard to complain thereof. It further
holds that where a deed conveys the coal under a tract of
land, together with the right to enter upon and under said
land and to mine, excavate, and remove all of it, there is no
implied reservation in such an instrument that the grantee
must leave enough coal to support the surface in its original
position. One judge dissents and files a very elaborate dis-
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senting opinion and a so-called 'additional opinion and these
two dissenting opinions together with the opinion of the
court form a most excellent and exhaustive review of the
questions involved. The authorities in point are thoroughly
considered and the decision is well worthy of study and will
no doubt become a leading case upon this branch of the law.

TAXATION.

Difficult questions as to the situs of personal property
arise in connection with the taxation of foreign corporations.
Foreign
A decision relating to this question appears in
Corporations People &c. v. Wells &c., 77
N. E. 19, where
the Court of Appeals of New York decides that where a
foreign corporation maintaining an office in the state for the
sale of its products, which are imported into the state and
sold in original packages, takes bills receivable as the proceeds of the imported goods so sold, and such bills are not
in transitu, but are, in the regular course of business, held
within the state until maturity for. the convenience of such
corporation, and the proceeds thereof, in part, remitted to the
home office in a foreign country, such bills are taxable as
capital employed within the state, within the meaning of the
tax law. One judge dissents. Compare New Orleans v.
Stempel, 175 U. S. 309.

TENANCY IN COMMON.

The Supreme Court of Michigan holds in Walker v.
Marion, io6 N. W. 400, that a contract by a tenant in comAuthority f mon, giving permissionto one to erect signCot...to

and bill-boards on the lands, was not binding on

the cotenants.
211.

Compare Moreland v. Strong. IT 5, Mich.
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WATERS.

The tendency of the courts to depart from the old rule
with respect to percolating waters appears in Pence et al. v.
Carney et al., 52 S. E. 702, where the Supreme
Percolating
Wate rs
Court of Appeals of West Virginiaholdsthatthe
owner of land who explores for and produces subterranean
percolating water within the boundary of his land is limited
to a reasonable and beneficial use of such water, when to otherwise use it would deplete the water-supply of a valuable
natural spring of another on adjoining or neighboring land,
and thereby materially injure or destroy such spring. Compare Smith v. Brooklyn, 54 N. E. 787, 45 L. R. A. 664.
WILLS.

In Wilson v. Gordon, 53 S. E. 79, it appeared that an
attorney was employed by two maiden sisters on joint
Mutual Wis request to prepare two wills, giving the property
of each to the other, with the provision that, if
the devisee should die in the lifetime of testator, the property
should go to a niece and her children. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court of South Carolina decides that
these were not mutual wills and that the surviving sister,
after having accepted the benefit of the deceased sister's will,
might destroy her own will. Compare Edson v. Parsons,
5o N. E. II17; and Cawley's Appeal, 20 Atl. 567, io L. R.
A. 93The Supreme Court of North Carolina decides in Hoggard v. Jordan, 53 S. E. 220, that where a husband devised
Election: What t o
Constitutes

the wife for life certain real estate of which
the wife was a part owner, with the remainder

over to their children, and the widow took possession, after
qualifying as executrix, and remained in possession nine
years, until her death, and the children acquiesced in the will
for eight years thereafter, there was an election, so that a
petition to sell a portion of the lands as the property of the
widow to make assets to pay her debts after her decease
could not be maintained. Compare the recent case of Tripp
v. Nobles, 136 N. C. 99, 67 L. R. A. 449.

